










This paper shows that incompatible monetary policies in Argentina and Brazil have produced 
adverse effects on the structures of intra-regional trade and other target variables of economic 
integration in the MERCOSUR. The long-term coexistence of a foreign-reserve-oriented 
regime in Argentina with more flexible policies in Brazil has led to the development of a 
fundamental asymmetry in the adjustment mechanisms of both economies to common shocks. 
In several steps of modelling and econometric analysis the paper provides evidence for 
economic disintegration that has been caused by this lack of monetary integration. 
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 Introduction 
The year 1991 marked the beginning of two policy experiments in South America that were to 
have far-reaching consequences for the economic development in the region. On 26 March 
1991, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay signed the Treaty of Asuncion by which the 
four countries created the institutional framework for MERCOSUR, the Common Market of 
the South. A few days later, on 1 April, Argentina's Congress approved a law to guarantee the 
full convertibility of the newly created currency, the peso, to the US dollar at the rate of one-
to-one. Since the law confined the issue of  pesos almost exclusively to the official dollar 
reserves, monetary policy in Argentina was subject to a (quasi-)currency-board rule.  
The formation of the MERCOSUR bloc, embedded the idea that economic integration 
could foster economic growth in South America by intensifying trade and financial relations, 
in particular between Argentina and Brazil, the two dominant economies in the region.
1  
The Argentinian currency board was interpreted as a precondition for macroeconomic 
stability and growth. It aimed at  curbing  the hyperinflation process that had plagued the 
country throughout the 1980s. By the mid-1990s, both reforms seemed to be successfull. 
Argentinian inflation was under control, and the growth rates of Argentinian GDP as well as 
intra-MERCOSUR trade rose faster than expected. Despite some disturbances, in the wake of 
the 1995 Mexican crisis, Brazil, too, had succeeded in getting rid of hyperinflation by pegging 
its new currency, the real, to the US dollar.  
Referring to Europe, where the 1991 Treaty of Maastricht had set the members of the 
European Common Market on the path towards monetary union, both politicians and 
economists began to speculate about combining economic integration in the MERCOSUR 
with monetary integration in the not too distant future.  
At present, those past debates look very distant. The Argentinian currency board 
collapsed in January 2002, in the middle of a deep and protracted crisis whose beginnings 
date back to the Asian crisis in 1997 and the devaluation of the Brazilian real in early 1999. 
With hindsight, it seems almost trivial to say that the two experiments of the 1991 vintage – 
MERCOSUR and the Argentinian currency board – proved to be incompatible with each 
                                                 
1 The GNPs and populations of Argentina and Brazil amount to more than 96 per cent of the total 
figures for the MERCOSUR. In 1999, Argentina's GNP share was 26.5 per cent, its population share 
17.3 per cent. The figures for Brazil were 70.8 and 79.0 per cent, respectively. Due to this 
dominance, MERCOSUR will henceforth largely be taken as synonymous with Argentina and 
Brazil, neglecting the other two member countries, Paraguay and Uruguay.  
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other. Since 1999 Brazil had gone over to inflation targeting under floating exchange rates. 
The concomitant depreciation of the real against the peso contributed (together with other 
factors) to a catastrophical decline of industrial production in Argentina. This undermined the 
credibility of the currency board rule and created, at the same time, tensions within the 
MERCOSUR that have threatened to halt the whole project of creating a common market in 
the region. In the end, the "boarded peg" of the peso to the dollar had to be abandoned. 
Yet it would be misleading to consider the period between 1999 and 2002 as an 
exceptional episode of inconsistent macroeconomic policies in an otherwise consistent story 
of economic integration. In our paper we show that fundamental differences in the monetary 
policies of Argentina and Brazil have existed even at times, when both countries had their 
currencies pegged to the dollar. We argue that these policy differences have led to 
asymmetries in the mechanisms by which the Argentinian and Brazilian economies adjust to 
common shocks, and that the asymmetries tend to have adverse effects on the volumes and 
sectoral patterns of trade between the two countries.  
The general idea behind this "joint hypothesis" can be described with reference to the 
recent discussion about the endogeneity of Optimum Currency Areas (OCA). In the tradition 
of Mundell (1961), the standard OCA criteria for successful monetary integration through 
hard pegs or currency union are either (a) the symmetry of shocks in their impact on the 
subregions of the currency area in question, or (b) the existence of adjustment mechanisms 
(such as factor price flexibility, factor mobility and fiscal federalism) that would compensate 
for the loss of exchange rate flexibility. In their seminal paper, Frankel and Rose (1997) have 
pointed out that the symmetry of shocks may be an outcome rather than a precondition of 
monetary integration. Exchange rate certainty or the use of a common currency lead to more 
integrated trade (indicated by rising shares of intra-industry trade), which in turn synchronizes 
business cycles between the subregions. In this sense, shocks are made more symmetric and 
the optimality of a currency area could be considered as endogenous. 
Conversely, we would argue that incompatible macroeconomic policies produce 
adverse structural effects on trade by making business cycles in the subregions less 
synchronous and more asymmetric in the impact of the underlying shocks. In other words, the 
lack of monetary integration between Argentina and Brazil has led to economic disintegration 
in the MERCOSUR. Following this introduction, the paper is organized in five further 
sections. In section 2 we make use of a simple macroeconomic model of the  Mundell-
Fleming type to describe various scenarios in which the policy differences translate into 
asymmetric transmission of common shocks. In section 3 we present results of cointegration 
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analysis and error correction modelling that give evidence of the relevant differences in the 
monetary and exchange rate policies of Argentina and Brazil in the 1980s and 1990s. In 
section 4 we present a structural VAR model for the period 1980-2001 that provides empirical 
support for our hypothetical conclusions from section 3, showing a lack of synchronization in 
the macroeconomic policies of Argentina and Brazil. In section 5, we describe the behaviour 
of the Grubel-Lloyd index of intra-industry trade at high levels of sectoral disaggregation and 
present estimation results that suggest a strong influence of macroeconomic policies on trade 
structures in Argentina and Brazil. In section 6 we sum up our arguments, concluding that 
monetary policies in the two countries are unlikely to be neutral in the long run, since their 
repercussions affect the trade pattern and other real target variables of economic integration in 
the MERCOSUR.      
2   Macroeconomic policy asymmetries: Hypothetical transmission mechanisms  
In this section, we employ a Mundell/Fleming-type model to demonstrate how the differences 
between the monetary policies in Argentina and Brazil in the 1990s can be understood to have 
led to asymmetries in the transmission of common shocks to the MERCOSUR region. Despite 
its well-known limitations, the Mundell/Fleming framework helps to highlight the problems 
that incompatible monetary and exchange rate policies create for trade integration.
2   
We consider two scenarios with alternative exchange rate arrangements between the 
economies  A, B and  C.
  3  Countries  A  and  B are neighbours, with plans of further trade 
integration, whereas C is a big economy outside the region. The three economies may thus be 
taken to represent Argentina (A), Brazil (B) and the USA, or simply the rest of the world (C). The 
scenarios differ by the constellations of exchange rate arrangements, as shown below: 
  exchange rates 
  A/C B/C A/B 
Scenario 1  fixed fixed fixed 
Scenario 2  fixed floating  floating 
     
The underlying model is described by the following equations (with subscripts A, B and C for 
the respective economies): 
  YD Y r Y e f A A B A C A = (,,, ,
* )
                                                
            ( 1 )  
 
2 See Argy (1994, pp. 150-93). Those who are in need of some rough cost-benefit analysis of the 
Mundell/Fleming framework might want to consult Krugman (1995) and (2000). 
3 The following draws on Falcão Silva, Andrade and Trautwein (2002). There a third scenario is considered, 
extending scenario 2 to a semi-flexible exchange rate arrangement (moving target zones) between B and the 
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  YD Y r Y e f BB A B C B = (,,, ,
* )             ( 2 )  
  M L Y r A A A = (,)                     ( 3 )  
  M L Y r BB = (, B )              ( 4 )  
  MM B = B               ( 5 )  
  r r A B =                       ( 6 )  
 0 = − BP Y Y Y e r r BBA C Bc (,,, ,
* )             ( 7 )  
  ee =                ( 8 )  
where Y denotes output, M the real money supply, r the interest rate,  f  the fiscal variable, and 
e the real exchange rate. The first two equations represent goods market equilibria (IS curves), 
whereas equations (3) and (4) are equilibrium conditions for the financial markets (LM 
curves). Equation (5) states that country B controls the money supply, under floating as well 
as fixed exchange rates; in the latter case, monetary control is based on sterilization policy. 
Equation (6) is for perfect capital mobility between A and B. Equation (7), the condition for 
balance-of-payment equilibrium, is required for the determination of B’s exchange-rates under 
floating. The last equation states the target level of the exchange rate under a fixed exchange-
rate system. It is assumed that domestic prices in A and B are fixed or sticky in the short run. 
It is further assumed that capital is perfectly mobile between the two countries, but that it is 
less than perfectly mobile in relation to C. This sets the focus on the relationship between A 
and B.  
Scenario 1    Exchange rates are credibly fixed between the currencies of all three countries. In 
the integration area (A+B), monetary and fiscal policies of B should generally have a stronger 
impact on A than vice versa, since B is the bigger economy (note that Brazilian GDP is about 2.5 
times the size of its Argentinian counterpart). Moreover, monetary policies in A and B differ. The 
authorities in B use open-market operations to sterilize the effects of foreign reserve flows on the 
domestic money supply, whereas A has a currency-board arrangement. In this scenario, B will 
dominate in terms of monetary policy. Changes in the money supply of A will affect B’s level of 
reserves, but not its money supply. This has further implications which can be seen from the 
discussion of various types of shocks and their transmission through the two economies. 
  Shocks from Brazil  Monetary expansion in B  will feed through to A . The new 
equilibrium positions display a lower level of interest rates and higher output in both countries. 
Fiscal expansion in B, on the other hand, will have a contractionary effect on A. The reason is 
sterilization policy in B. Starting from the initial equilibrium the fiscal shock originating in B 
                                                                                                                                                          
   
other two economies.   5
shifts the IS curve of  B - ISB - to the right, towards a new equilibrium in which both output and 
interest are higher. B’s increased demand for imports raises net exports of A, shifting ISA to the 
right. This positive spillover is outweighed, however, by outflows of reserves from A to B  that 
are induced by B’s higher interest rate. Since B sterilizes the reserve inflows, the equilibrium 
interest rate in the region will raise, leading to a decline in A’s output, as the LM curve of A - 
LMA – shifts to the left.  
  Shocks from Argentina  Monetary shocks originating in A will be dampened in B and 
thereby lose force in A as well. Since A sticks to its exchange rate target and refrains from 
making use of sterilization practices, it cannot, at any rate, conduct independent monetary policy. 
Hence the only remaining option (in this simple macroanalytical framework) is fiscal policy. 
Fiscal expansion in A leads to a rightward shift of  ISA. Both output and interest rise, leading to 
positive spillovers from A to B through trade, but also to negative spillovers through interest 
arbitrage. ISB shifts to the right, whereas LMB shifts to the left. However, the new equilibria are 
not stable, because the reserve outflows from B are neutralized by open-market operations. These 
leakages will reinforce the positive impact of A’s fiscal expansion and, together with capital 
flows from C to A, they will make the interest rate return to its initial in the final equilibrium. 
Accordingly, fiscal expansion in A does not lead to any crowding out of private investment. Due 
to fixed exchange rates, there is no crowding out by way of appreciation, and sterilization policy 
in B eliminates the negative interest rate effects. In their spillovers to and feedbacks from B, the 
fiscal shocks coming from A  are amplified. Scenario 1 thus shows a peculiar trade off in 
Argentinian stabilization policy: What the country lost in terms of monetary policy 
independence, it gained – at least for a while – in terms of fiscal policy effectiveness. Note that 
the same logic applies to fiscal contraction. 
 Shocks from the rest of the world  While the sterilization policy of B contributes to 
making the macroeconomic policy options for A more asymmetric, it can be shown to produce 
greater symmetry in the effects of external shocks to the A+B region than would otherwise be 
the case. In general, one might argue that any change in the net capital flows between C and 
the A+B  region affects the money supplies both in A and B. However, sterilization in B 
insulates the domestic money supply from reserve shocks caused by capital flows to or from 
C. Moreover, in the case of a negative reserve shock, outflows from A to C, which normally 
would lead to a contraction of output in A, are mitigated by arbitrage-related inflows of capital 
from  B.  Consider, for example, the reserve shock on the region that followed from the 
Mexican "tequila crisis" 1994-95. Both Argentina and Brazil lost nearly one third of their 
foreign reserves within a few weeks. By neutralizing some of the contractionary effect of this 
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loss on the domestic money supply, the Brazilian Central Bank helped to dampen the effects 
of the reserve shock on Argentina: directly by way of arbitrage-related capital flows, and 
indirectly by preventing Brazilian output and demand for imports from Argentina from 
declining in proportion to reserve holdings.   
However, in the wake of the Asian and Russian crises 1997-98, worldwide investor 
uncertainty about financial prospects in emerging markets increased dramatically. Intra-
Brazilian haggling over the stance of fiscal policy contributed to sudden and strong outflows 
of foreign reserves that the Brazilian Central Bank was no longer willing nor able to 
neutralize. In early 1999, Brazil decided to switch from exchange rate targeting to inflation 
targeting under floating exchange rates, whereas Argentina preferred to stick to its dollar-
based currency-board rule.This made Argentina much more vulnerable to external shocks, as 
shown in the next scenario. 
 
Scenario 2     Country B lets the exchange rates of its currency float vis-à-vis the currencies of A 
and C. The exchange rate between the currencies of A and C remains fixed. In comparison with 
Scenario 1 this constellation reveals fundamental differences in the adjustments to negative 
external shocks (such as unexpectedly high reserve outflows). The currency board arrangement 
in A relies mainly on quantity adjustments in the domestic financial markets (LM shifts) that tend 
to produce output changes. The floating rate regime in B  allows for compensating price 
adjustments through the foreign exchange and goods markets (IS shifts) that help, to some 
extent, to keep output stable. However, the interaction of quantity adjustments in one economy 
and price adjustments in the other may develop into a vicious circle that destabilizes output and 
trade in the region.  
  The core problem is the double impact of external shocks on A. The transmission of 
common negative shocks through the economy B leads to a depreciation of B's currency, which 
now amplifies the effects of the original shock on A by reducing net exports to B, i.e. A tends to 
import more from and to export less to B. The economy of A is hit twice: first through the reserve 
flows from A to C, then through the effects of the depreciation of B's currency. It may be argued 
that the counterveiling effect of sterilization in B carries over to Scenario 2 insofar as the rise in 
the interest rate of A (following from the leftward LM shift) attracts capital from B. However, 
this adds only further momentum to the depreciation of B's currency. The project of regional 
trade integration will be at risk, because the depreciation implies not only a decline in A's net 
exports. The level of trade will also be affected, if the contraction in A's output and income leads 
to lower imports from B.     
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3  Monetary policies in Argentina and Brazil  
In the 1980s and early 1990s both Argentina and Brazil went through several episodes of 
hyperinflation and failed experiments with currency reform. It was only with the introduction 
of the quasi-currency-board rule for monetary policy in April 1991 that the Argentinian 
authorities succeeded in restoring monetary stability. The core element of the rule was the 
guarantee of completely unrestricted one-to-one convertibility of the newly created peso 
(notes and coins) into US dollars. In this way, the Central Bank of Argentina committed itself 
to limiting the supply of base money to the equivalent of its official dollar reserves.  
In Brazil, the return to low inflation took even longer, despite the emergency measures 
against hyperinflation that had been taken in connection with the Planos Collor I and II in 
1990. The Plano Real of  July 1994 met with more success, as the authorities followed the 
Argentinian example in making the newly created currency unit, the real, fully convertible 
into the US dollar at a one-to-one exchange rate. Monetary policy was designed to keep the 
money supply in line with the dollar reserves. However, unlike its Argentinian counterpart the 
Brazilian Central Bank did not explicitly state the relationship between changes in monetary 
base and movements in foreign reserves. Moreover, the Plano Real allowed of some degree of 
discretion in that the exchange rate was permitted to move within a target band. The Bank of 
Brazil thus had some leeway to neutralize changes in official reserve holdings in their effects 
on the monetary base and domestic credit. This raises the question in how far it actually made 
use of this freedom to sterilize inflows and buffer outflows of foreign reserves.  
Thus it is interesting to compare Brazilian monetary policy after the realization of the 
"Real Plan" with the stance of Argentinian monetary policy. Did the differences in the formal 
design of monetary policies in the two countries really make a difference? To see this, we 
have investigated the long-run properties of the relevant time series by making use of 
cointegration analysis. The main results are presented in the following.
4 
For Argentina, we have estimated the relationship between foreign reserves and 
monetary base for the period 1991:M3 to 2001:M5.
5  
The Johansen procedure with one lag yielded the following cointegration vector.  
                                                 
4 The following draws on Andrade, Falcão Silva and Carneiro (2000), and Falcão Silva, Andrade and Trautwein 
(2002), where the institutional developments of the monetary policies, further relevant facts and procedures of 
our econometric analysis are spelt out in greater detail. 
   
5 The variables are measured by end-of-period monthly values, taken from reports of the Argentinian Central 
Bank. They yield an I(1) process under both the ADF and the Phillips-Perron tests. The series present several 
breaks in the period that goes from 2001:M6 to 2003:M3 that comprehends the economic turmoil that Argentina 
went through and for that reason this period was not included in the sample.   8
            ( 9 )   t t R M   0.915
(0.00895)  
=
where M denotes the monetary base and R the foreign reserves both expressed in dollar values.  
The results of our cointegration analysis suggest that Argentina followed the quasi-
currency-board rule closely throughout the period examined.  
It is interesting to note that the relationship between domestic credit CR and reserves R can be 
derived from the above relationship taking into account that: CR R M − =
6. Indeed the 
cointegration exercise shows that there is one cointegration vector between CR and R as the 
following:    t t R CR
(0.00895)  
0.085 =
Turning to Brazil, we considered the relationship between foreign reserves and 
domestic credit to be most relevant for an examination of the sterilization policy of the 
Central Bank. Here, as in the Argentinian case, we have made use of cointegration analysis. 
To preserve uniformity we chose the same period of analysis. Johansen method provided us 
with one cointegration vector:  
(0.060)  
t 0.814 -   R CRt =           ( 1 0 )  
Where CR and R are the amount of domestric credit and foreign reserves in dollar 
value.  
Similarly, because of the definition of domestic credit as before, the relationship 
between monetary base and foreign reserves presented a long run relationship complementary 
to the previous one with the following result: 
t t R M
) 07 , 0 (
186 , 0 =  
  On the whole, these results confirm that the Brazilian monetary authorities have 
consistently pursued a policy of insulating the development of domestic monetary aggregates 
from changes in foreign reserves throughout the whole sample. The existence of a negative 
long-run relationship between currency reserves and domestic credit suggest that there was 
some scope for independent monetary policy even when Brazil officially changed to a regime 
of exchange rate targeting to subdue inflation. These findings stand in stark contrast with our 
results for Argentina where the monetary base (as the relevant cointegrated variable) was 
shown to have closely followed the movements of the official reserve holdings.   
                                                 
6 Domestic credit used in this experiment should be understood as one of the two assets of the Central Bank, namely 
Net domestic-currency bonds. These are the assets that are used in sterilization policies. (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 
Foundations of International Macroeconomics, 1996) 
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  The previous analysis suggests strongly that the monetary policy of Argentina and 
Brazil was starklingly distinct during the period considered. In addition to that we should note 
that from February 1999 on  Brazilian exchange rate regime became more flexible tending 
towards a dirty floating type, while Argentina was still trying to keep its currency board 
system.  Shortly after that Argentinian system started to fall apart, and by the second  half of 
2002 it was bound to float.  
  This section supports the idea that the scenarios we have analysed in the section 2 of 
the paper are not entirely abstract and have been partly enforced during the recent past of 
Argentina’s and Brazil’s economies.  
4   Asymmetric transmission of shocks: Empirical evidence  
One of the core propositions of OCA theory is that a region could be considered fit for monetary 
integration if shocks affect the different economies in the region in a symmetric fashion. In the 
earlier sections we have shown (a)  that there have been notable differences between the 
monetary policies in Argentina and Brazil ever since the foundation of MERCOSUR, and (b) 
that these differences may have produced asymmetries in the effects of common intra-regional 
and external shocks on these two MERCOSUR economies. The asymmetries in the transmission 
of shocks are likely to be strongest if the countries in the region pursue extremely different 
exchange rate policies, as they have done between 1999 and 2002. But they exist even when only 
the underlying monetary policies differ in terms of the sterilization of foreign reserve flows. So 
far, our argumentation concerning (b) has been a purely speculative exercise. We now proceed to 
provide some empirical evidence for those conclusions. 
  Since the comovement of economies (in terms of output and other macrovariables) in 
their reactions to shocks can be considered as an OCA criterion, we started our analysis by 
comparing the income cycles of Argentina and Brazil for the period  ranging from 1980 to 
2001. We used different filters to extract the cyclical components from quarterly data.
7 Three 
out of five filters suggest that there is a slight co-movement between the series, with cross 
correlation between contemporaneous values in the range of 0.2 to 0.4 (see Table 1). 
However, the Box-Jenkins white noise filter yields a much lower value and the Beveridge-




                                                 
7 The sources for the quarterly GDP data are ipeadata in the case of Brazil, and Ministério de Economia in the 
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   Table 1 - Cross Correlation Cycles 
Lags -1 0  1  2 
Linear Filter  0.220  0.197  0.147  0.085 
Box Jenkins  0.029   0.051   0.010  -0.114 
Hodrick-Prescott  -0.066   0.468   0.141  -0.169 
Baxter-King  -0.152   0.405   0.055  -0.241 
Beveridge-Nelson -0.382 -0.544  -0.397  -0.092 
 
After this first appraisal of the nature of the cycles we examine the behaviour of  
domestic and external shocks to both economies by estimating a structural VAR model. The 
proposed VAR considers as domestic variables the GDPs and inflation rates of Argentina and 
Brazil (ya,yb,pa and pb).
8 As for the external factor we chose the change of the US interest 
rate (iu).   Instead of the prime we used the libor that has an homologous behaviour but 
presents larger variance.  Differently from the practice of estimating two separate VARs, one 
for each country, we decided to estimate only one VAR in which the effects of the other 
country are considered directly into the model and hence are interpreted as part of the external 
shocks. 
9 
The analysis uses monthly data and the period goes from June 1994 to March 2003. A 
larger period starting in 1980  was considered, however significant structural changes in the 
beginning of the 1990s in Argentina and in 1994 in Brazil led us to focus the estimation for 
the shorter period.  The definition of the sample is related to the regime switches that occurred 
in Argentina, after the Currency Board and in Brazil after the Real Plan . Augmented Dickey 
Fuller and KPSS tests (Kwiatowski et al. 1992) suggest that the GDPs Inflation rates of 
Argentina and Brazil, and the change in US interest rate series are I(0) processes  
In order to identify the structural shocks in the different variables of the model we had 
to specify some restrictions. We used the method of  Sims (1986) and Bernanke (1986) – 
instead of the Cholesky ortoghonal decomposition – based on a model in the structural form: 
() t t t X L B BX µ + = −1            
                                                                                                                                                          
case of Argentina. The deflators used were wpi  in both cases.  
8 The sources of the data are the following: GDP Argentina = ya: INDEC, Dirección Nacional de Cuentas 
Nacionales:  GDP Brazil = yb Central Bank, , pb -  ipeadata; interest rate USA = iu - IFS statistics. 
9 A similar model was estimated by Carrera et all (1988) for a different period (1980-1996). Differently from our 
model Carrera et all estimated two VARs, one for each country, and similarly used the USA rate of interest as 
one of the variables representing external shocks.  
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where  Xt  is the vector of the variables to be jointly explained by the VAR, which is 
, and where µ { t t t t t t t pb pa yb ya iu X , , , , = } t are the structural errors. The standard form of the 
VAR becomes: 
() t t t e X L A X + = −1             ( 1 1 )  
To identify the vector µt from the vector et, it should be noted that the errors are related by the 
following identity: 
t t e B =
− µ
1  or  t t Be = µ            ( 1 2 )  
Following the Sims (1986) methodology, we formulated a priori restrictions on these 
relationships and combined them with the above identity in order to identify the structural 
shocks µt. The a priory restrictions are:  
the US interest rate (iu) is exogenous; Argentina’s domestic income is related to 
contemporaneous Brazil’s income and to the external variable (iu);Brazil’s domestic 
income is related to the contemporaneous external variable (iu);the inflation rate of 
each country is related to its own income. 
The relationship between reduced and structural shocks can be presented in the 
following matrix form: 
The basic structural model reduces to IS relationships and augmented Phillips Curve 
relationships for each country, and can thus be interpreted as a model of aggregate demand 
and aggregate supply. The US interest rate that accounts for the external effects does not 
present any contemporaneous relationship with the other variables.  
The first line of  matrix B represents the restrictions to the behaviour of the interest 
rate. The next two lines define the aggregate demand for Argentina in an IS type equation, 
where Argentina's aggregate demand is presented as dependent on the foreign shocks and on 
Brazilian aggregate demand. The same specification is adopted for Brazil's aggregate demand, 
though in this case we had to drop its contemporaneous relationship to Argentina, otherwise 
the matrix would become singular. After the estimation of the standard model and the 
identification of the structural VAR through the Sims-Bernanke decomposition we proceeded 
to the analysis of the variance decomposition of the innovations. The main results are 
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Table 2 – Variance Decomposition of the Variables to Structural Shocks 
 
    Innovations from Structural VAR with Bernanke-Sims decomposition 












 1.13   3.90 






 2.36   3.01 






 1.57   1.36 






 82.85   0.49 






 2.48   63.82 
The results suggest that Argentina is more vulnerable to external shocks than Brazil. 
Taking Argentina's GDP (at the 24th step), 16 per cent of its variance is explained by shocks 
coming from US interest rate innovations. Considering additionally the shocks coming from 
Brazilian GDP (30,98%) and inflation (6,39%), this share rises to about 47  per cent. In the 
case of Brazilian GDP, only 8% per cent of the variance is explained by shocks coming from 
US interest rate innovations. Adding Argentinian GDP (21,38%) and inflation (1,57%), the 
share goes up to 31 per cent. Hence, common external shocks affect Argentina much more 
than Brazil, whereas the difference between Argentina and Brazil is less pronounced, if all 
non-domestic influences are taken into account. The converse applies to inflation. The 
innovations associated with Argentina's income affect more Brazilian inflation than 
innovations associated with Brazilian income itself.
10 Turning to the Phillips curve block (the 
two last lines), the innovations associated with Brazilian inflation become even more 
important. Argentina's inflation is highly affected by inflation in Brazil (61 per cent). 
The structural innovations estimated by the VAR (using the Sims-Bernanke 
decomposition) reveal that the shocks of the aggregate demand equations of these countries 
present very small cross contemporaneous correlations. (see Table 3)
11. This suggests that the 
domestic policies were far from symmetric in the sense that the structural shocks did not 
commove.  The contemporaneous correlation of the shocks of the aggregate supply equations 
(Phillips Curves) indicates the existence of a comovement. In addition to that the impulse 
                                                 
10 This result may come from the fact that Argentina’s exchange rate is fixed while Brazilian exchange rate was 
crawling peg in the beginning and became floating in the last three years.  
11 The test of the correlations with the null hypothesis of zero correlation relies on the property that the 
covariance between X and Y   is asymptotically  XY S ( ) [ ] n ii XY / ,
2
22 µ µ σ − Ν . We tested the null hypothesis 
that    0 = XY S
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response functions indicate that the response of the Argentinian output to the structural shock 
associated to the Brazilian demand is in the opposite direction of the response of Brazilian 
output to the structural shock associated to the Argentinian demand. 
 









us  1 2.63e-11  -2.48e-14  -0.145  -0.187 
ε
ya  2.63e-11 1  8.71e-08  -0.007  -0.036 
ε
yb  -2.48e-14 8.71e-08  1  0.025  -0.0118 
ε
pa  -0.145 -0.007 0.025  1  0.148 
ε
pb  -0.187 -0.036 -0.0118 0.148  1 
 
The main result of this analysis is the lack of symmetry between the effects of intra-
regional shocks on the two countries and the differences in the transmission of these shocks. 
Moreover, there is a clear difference in the impact of common external shocks on Brazil and 
Argentina. The empirical analysis in this section thus supports our conclusions from the 
preceding section: The differences in the macroeconomic policies of Argentina and Brazil 
have led to asymmetries in the transmission of shocks that do not make the MERCOSUR an 
area that is fit for monetary integration. One might rather speak of a process of monetary 
disintegration. 
 
5  The Effects of Incompatible Monetary Regimes upon Trade Integration 
Has monetary disintegration in the MERCOSUR had adverse effects on economic integration? 
Economic integration is frequently measured by shares of bilateral trade between the respective 
countries and, in particular, by the shares of intraindustry trade in total bilateral trade. An 
increasing share of intraindustry trade signals progress in the process of economic integration in 
the sense that the underlying structures of production in the respective economies become more 
similar to each other. Frankel and Rose (1997) propose that the factors that explain trade 
integration in this sense are, to a significant extent, endogenous to monetary integration. If that is 
the case, we would expect a negative effect from monetary disintegration on intraindustry trade. 
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  In the following we take a look at the development of intraindustry trade 
between Argentina and Brazil, using the well-known index  developed by Grubel and Lloyd 
(1971) in the following form: 
 









where T denotes the share of intraindustry trade, Exi the exports and Imi the imports of 
sector i. 









































Note: all4 and all3 are average index at 4 digits and 3 digits respectively of all sectors; M represents the 
average index at 4 digits of manufacture sectors only.  
 
Our illustration of this development in the years between 1990 and 2000 in Figure 1 is 
based on the construction of two pseudo panels at different levels of SITC sector 
disaggregation: at the 3-digit level with 173 sectors, and at the 4-digit level with 1017 
sectors.
12 The 3-digit data suggests that intraindustry trade increased substantially until 1997 
and then declined. The average 4-digit data suggests a slight increase of the index until 1999 
and a decline towards to its initial value after that. The result for the subdivision of 
manufacturing sectors is homologous.
13 This analysis suggests that the formal process of 
                                                 
12 The data source is Trade Office (SECEX), Brazilian Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade 
(MDIC). The data for manufacturing are aggregated from the 99 main industrial sectors (see Norma Comum 
de Mercadorias - NCM).  
   
13 For better understanding, we also ranked the sectors according to the period average intraindustry trade. Two 
partitions were considered, the first including all sectors with average index values between 0.2 and 0.4, the 
second including the sectors in the interval from 0.4 to 1.0. Considering the different partitions, the picture   15
MERCOSUR integration did not produce a large durable change in the degree of intraindustry 
trade between Argentina and Brazil. 
It is well known that the intraindustry trade index may be affected by macroeconomic 
policy. Examining the formula for the Grubel-Lloyd index (equation 13), we can see that it 
depends largely on the absolute value of net exports. Net exports are codetermined by changes 
in the bilateral exchange rate. Such changes may, in turn, be generated by interest rate 
differentials between the two countries. Concerning the levels of trade, the index depends also 
on the development of  the incomes in both countries. If they develop in an asymmetric or 
asynchronous fashion, their individual effects on trade may cancel each other out.  
Based on the above considerations we specified the following model in which the 
index was assumed to depend on macroeconomic policy variables: 
a b ba a b Y Y r r T 4 3 2 1 0 ] [ ] [ β β ε β β β + + + − + =  
where T is the index, rb and ra are the real interest rates, εba is the bilateral real exchange rate 
(real/peso), and Yb, Ya are the incomes of Argentina and Brazil, respectively.  
 
Table 4 - Model of the Intra Industry Trade 3 digits sample(Random Effects) 
 













a b r r −   -0.250 
(-6.04) 
























b Y    1.987 
(5.48) 
    0.668 
(0.44) 
RSq  0.504 0.508  0.505 0.507 0.509  0.509 
Adjusted RSq  0.503 0.507  0.505 0.507 0.508  0.508 
S.E. of regression  1.1853 1.1804  1.183  1.1812 1.1795  1.1801 
F-statistic          
Mean dependent  -1.5306  -1.5306  -1.5306 -1.5306 -1.5306  -1.5306 
S.D. dependent  1.6818  1.6818  1.6818 1.6818 1.6818  1.6818 
Sum Squared resid  2254.8  2236.3 2248.0  2239.2  2231.6 2.232.4 
N of Cross sections  172  172  172  172  172  172 
N.of  Observations  1608 1608  1608 1608 1608  1608 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
does not change much. The sectors that present a high average degree of integration show a substantial rise in 
the index before the implementation of the Plano Real in 1994, and stagnation thereafter. The other partition 
closely corresponds to the development in the average panel. 
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The panel data with 3-digit disaggregation fit the suggested model quite well. The 
estimation method used was GLS; random effects were not rejected.
 14 The main results are 
presented in Table 4 and can be summarized as follows:  
(a) The real exchange rate of the previous period and the interest rate differential have 
opposite signs, as might be expected. Despite the close relationship between the 
two variables, interest differentials add explanatory power.  
(b) The incomes of Argentina and Brazil play each a significant role; but when taken 
together (in F), their t values do not reject the null hypothesis of zero coefficients. 
This result may be explained with the lack of comovement indicated in the 
previous section.  
These findings suggest that macroeconomic policies are strongly relevant for the explanation 
of the behaviour of the intraindustry trade index for Argentina and Brazil.  
Next we used the panel data with 4-digit disaggregation to estimate the model for 
sectors with average index values of more than 0.2, to exclude all sectors with insignificant 
trade integration (Table 5). The Hausman test supported the use of fixed effects.
15   
Table 5 - Model of the Intra Industry Trade, 4-digit sample 
  A  B  C D E  F 






























   
RSq  0.258 0.269 0.269  0.263 0.265 0.267 
Adjusted RSq  0.147 0.159 0.159  0.153 0.155 0.158 
S.E. of regression  1.3163 1.3068 1.3068  1.3114 1.3098 1.308 
F-statistic 1534.7  1621.7  541.3  1579.7 1594.4 806.2 
Mean dependent  -1.3925  -1.3925  -1.3925 -1.3925 -1.3925 -1.3925 
S.D. dependent  1.4253  1.4253  1.4253 1.4253 1.4253 1.4253 
Sum Squared resid  7651.9  7575.8 7537.9  7594.4 7537.9 7552.8 
N of Cross sections  659  659  659  659  659  659 





                                                 
14 The Hausman test did not reject the random effects. Chsq = 1.287 and the critical values for Chsq(3) are 9.35 
and 11.34 at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
15 The value of the Hausman test is 475, and the critical value of the chi-square (3) is 9.35 and 11.34 at 5 and 1 
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The results confirm the previous findings, showing that the bilateral exchange rate, the 
interest rate differentials and the incomes of the countries are all relevant factors in 
determining the development of intraindustry trade. We conclude that the average behaviour 
of the Grubel-Lloyd index in the period from 1990 to 2000 can to a significant extent be 
explained by macroeconomic policy variables.  
6 Conclusion   
Our analysis of the differences between the monetary policies in Brazil and Argentina and 
their consequences for macroeconomic developments suggests that monetary disintegration in 
the MERCOSUR has created obstacles to economic integration, and in particular to trade 
integration in the region. It may seem trivial to state that, with a view to economic integration, 
the exchange rate regimes of Argentina and Brazil were absolutely incompatible in the years 
between 1999 and 2002, when Brazil had switched to floating, whereas Argentina preferred to 
stick to its currency board arrangement. However, we have shown that the incompatibility 
problems were present even in the period from 1994 to 1999, when both countries had their 
exchange rates pegged to the US dollar. To put it simply, sterilization of foreign reserve flows 
to and from Brazil made the difference that created various asymmetries in the effectiveness 
of domestic macroeconomic policies and in the impacts of external shocks on the two 
economies. In this way, the lack of comovement between the national incomes of Argentina 
and Brazil that had existed prior to the foundation of MERCOSUR, because both economies 
were much less open and went through different cycles of stagflation in the 1980s, was 
perpetuated by a lack of macroeconomic policy coordination in the MERCOSUR.   
  However, in the all-fixed exchange rates constellation of the mid-1990s (Scenario 1 in 
section 3), trade integration would at least be favoured by monetary expansion in Brazil or by 
fiscal expansion in Argentina. The difference in the monetary policy regimes may, moreover, 
have helped to buffer external shocks, as in the case of the Mexican crisis of 1994-95. Yet, 
these two types of expansionary policies did also contribute to undermining the constellation 
of intraregionally fixed exchange rates, when the increasing force of external shocks in the 
wake of the Asian and Russian crises in 1997-98 made the region's currencies look more and 
more overvalued, thus provoking demands for active stabilization policy. 
  The underlying asymmetries of policy effectiveness and shock impacts were 
exacerbated, when Brazil switched to floating in 1999. Now even external shocks had clearly 
adverse effects on trade integration and the synchronization of economic development in the 
                                                                                                                                                          
per cent levels, respectively.  
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region. They worked their way through the two economies in a fashion that made Argentina 
being hit twice – first by the original shock and thereafter by its repercussions through the 
depreciation of the Brazilian currency.  
  The filter analysis and the structural VAR model of section 4 suggest that much of the 
observable divergence in the pattern of output fluctuation is explained by the above described 
asymmetries. The lack of macroeconomic policy coordination in the MERCOSUR has led to 
setbacks in the process of trade integration. The Grubel-Lloyd index of intraindustry trade 
between Argentina and Brazil shows (at 3 and 4-digit levels of disaggregation) that the shares 
of intraindustry trade increased up to the year 1997 and declined thereafter. Our 
corresponding analysis of  pseudo panel data suggests that the index is very sensitive to 
bilateral exchange rate, interest rate differentials and income developments. This conforms 
with general observations that, since 1999, the depreciation of the Brazilian real and the 
severe contraction of aggregate demand in Argentina has produced strong negative effects on 
the productive capacity of the Argentinean economy – an experience that hardly makes a 
good base for further economic integration. On the contrary, monetary disintegration has 
spurred conflicts over remaining trade barriers in the region that might otherwise have been 
eliminated long ago. Argentina has accused Brazil of pursuing a "beggar thy neighbour" 
policy, but it has finally had to accept that its own policy of "beggaring the IMF" by sticking 
to the currency board was unsustainable. In January 2002, convertibility law was suspended 
and the peso quickly lost much of its value against the dollar. Since then, the obstacles to 
macroeconomic policy coordination and monetary integration in the MERCOSUR may have 
become smaller. Yet, the monetary disintegration of the past has had so many detrimental 
effects on the levels and structures of production and trade in the region that the current 
prospects of economic integration in the MERCOSUR can hardly be considered favourable.  
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